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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD G. FOOTE, SHIRLEY
P. FOOTE, and VENICE THEATRE
CORPORATION,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,

vs.

Case No. 16533

NEWTON A. TAYLOR,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages brought by PlaintiffsRespondent's Richard G. Foote, his wife, Shirley P. Foote, for
and in behalf of the Venice Theatre Corporation. PlaintiffRespondents claim that the Defendant-Appellant, Newton Taylor
breached a real property lease and personal property purchase
agreement which caused
payments.

subs~antial

loss of rents and monthly

In addition, Plaintiff-Respondent'

the real property.

claim damages to

Defendant-Appellant counter-claimed for

damages alleging prior breach by Plaintiff-Respondents.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court, the Honorable David Sam, District Judge,
presiding, held as follows:

That the real property lease, and

the personal property purchase were two separate agreements;
that the Defendant-Appellant breached the contracts;

that

the Defendant-Appellants Motion to Strike damage allegations
except for the claim for liquidatrd damages expressed in the
personal property agreement, should be denied; that the

Plaintif~

Respondent had been injured for loss of fair rental to building
and equipment in -che amount of $2,052.16; that Plaintiff'Respondent,
"did not clearly show what damage was suffered" to the real
property, but was none-the-less entitled to retain DefendantAppellant's $1,000.00 dov.:npayment "for any such damage;" and
that Plaintiff-Respondent was entitled to $1,150.00 for Attorneys
fees and court costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's decision
that the real property lease and the personal property purchase
were two separate agreements, and a reversal of the denial of
Appellant's Motion for damages to be limited to the liquidated
·amages expressed in the personal property agreement.
In the event this Court does not reverse the trial judge's
ecision

that there were two agreements, then Appellant seeks

a ruling that the liquidated damages provision would still apply
to the personal property agreCC'ment, and the tot a 1 award should be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

reduced in accordance
determination.
Library Services andwith
Technologythat
Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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In the event this Court does not reverse the trial
judge's decision that there were two agreements, then Appella:
seeks a ruling that the liquidated damages provision would still
apply to the personal property agreement, and the total award
should be reduced in accordance with that determination.
In the event this Court does not grant any of the relief
prayed for above, then Appellant seeks a reversal of the award
of Appellant's downpayment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the sununer of 1978, Mr. Newton Taylor investigated
the possibility of establishing an Italian Place Restaurant in
Nephi, Utah.

Pursuant to his investigation he entered into

negotiations with Richard G. Foote as to the possibility
of acquiring the Venice Theater and Venice Pizza Hut, which were
both in the same building.

Mr. Taylor made it known that he was

not interested in the theater, but was willing to take it along
with the restaurant if necessary.

Mr. Foote made it clear

that it was his position that they would both have to be taken
together.
On or about the 7th day of August, 1978, the parties signed
an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase covering the
personal property (restaurant and theater equipment) contained
within the Venice Theater and Venice Pizza Hut.

The signed

document contained an additional typed-in-clause which stated:
"This sale shall be accompanied by the attached Lease-Purchase
!i[',rl'<'rntent on the bui1uing located at 86 South t!ain, Nephi, Utah.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was signed on or about the 11th day of August, four days after
the Earnest Money Document was signed.

Uncontroverted testimony

by both parties during the lower court trial indicated that
although there were two documents, it was all part of the same
agreement.
The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase included
provisions for downpayment, monthly payments,
terms.

~nd

other related

Mr. Taylor was required to make a $1,000.00 downpayment

and additional monthly payments of $304.29 per month.

The

contract provided that, "In the event the purchaser fails to pay
the balance of said purchase price

complete said purchase

as herein provided, the amounts paid hereon, shall, at the option
of the Seller, be retained as liquidated damages."
The document containing the lease on the real property
also included payment provisions anc c·ther related terms.

By

the terms of the lease, Mr. Taylor was to pay Mr. Foote $240.00
per month for the lease of the building.

It should be noted that

the lease also contained an option to '•uy which could be exercised
by Mr. Taylor, and provided that all lease payments made prior to
the exercise of the option would apply to the purchase, if the
option were exercised.
At the time of the signing of tL

above-mentioned documents

it was orally agreed upon by the parties that the roof over the
restaurant was in need of repair, and that said repair should be
the financial responsibility of Mr. Foote.

Apparently, there was

some misunderstanding between the parties as to wht'ther Mr. TayJo:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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would have the roof repaired and take the cost thereof out
of the rent payments, or Mr. Foote would arrange to have the
roof repaired on his own.

This misunderstanding resulted in no

action being taken to repair the roof until sometime near the
end of October.
During this period of time from August until late October,
Mr. Taylor operated the theater, but was unable to open the restaurant.

He had started renovation of the restaurant kitchen

and had obtained a franchise for an Italian Place Restaurant.
As part of his franchise package, he was to receive restaurant
kitchen equipment.

However, Mr. Taylor could no1: take delivery

of the equipment while the kitchen roof still leaked.

Therefore,

the restaurant could not be opened as long as the roof leaked over
the kitchen area.
In October of 1978, there were several communications between
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Foote concerning the roof repair.

Some of

the communications were made in person and some through counsel
of both parties.

Mr. Taylor refused to make any rent or purchase

payments until the roof was repaired.

Mr. Foote refused to have

the roof repaired until the payments were made.

Sometime

during these communications Mr. Taylor made it clear that if the
roof was not repaired by October 31, 1978, he would consider
the contract null and void.

On October 31, 1978, Mr. Taylor

entered the kitchen of the restaurant and could still see light
thrc•ugh the roof, he immediately vacated the premises.
-5-
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ARGuMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EARNEST
MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE FOR EQUIPMENT, AND
THE LEASE AGREEMENT TO THE VENICE THEATRE AND PIZZA PARLOR,
CONSTITUTED TWO SEPARATE AGREEMENTS WHICH WERE NOT MERGED.
It is practically a universal rule of law that where
two or more writings are executed at or near the same time,
in the course of the same transaction and concerning the same
subject matter, they should be read together.

First National

Bank of Hutchenson vs. Kaiser, 222 Kan. 274, 564 P. 2d 493
(1977).

The Colorado Supreme Court in interpreting this rule has

gone so far as to say that not only should each agreement be
construed in light of the other, but that a fundamental principle
of construction requires that they be treated "as one and the same
instrument,"
(1969)

Harty v. Hoerner, 170 Coln. 506, 463 P.2d

(emphasis added).

The rule has

~n

313

held to apply even

when the writings do not expressly refE_ to each other.
Haspray v. Pasarelli, 79 Nev. 203,380 P.2d 919 (1963).
The validity of this rule in Utah was recently affirmed
by this Court in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. vs. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261,
501 P.2d 266 (1972).

The facts of thac case are remarkably

analogous to the facts of the case at bar.

The Plaintiff,

Bullfrog Marina, Inc. had negotiated with the Defendant, Lentz
to operate a houseboat business at Lake Powell.

In order to
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avoid certain restrictions governing the Plaintiff's concessions,
the parties entered into two agreements, one styled after an
employment contract wherein the Plaintiff employed the
Defendant to operate a houseboat rental service; the other
designated a lease whereby the Plaintiff leased three houseboats from the Defendant.

Both contracts were to become effective

on the same date and were to run for the same term of two
years.
At trial, the trial Court found that the Defendant would not
have leased the boats to the Plaintiff unless he could operate
the houseboat rental service, and due to the relationship
between the lease and the employment contract, the trial judge
held that the two writings should be considered as one agreement.
In affirming the decision of the trial Court, this Court stated,
.... here two or more instruments are
executed by the same parties contemporaneously,
or at different times in the course of the same
transaction, and concern the same subject matter,
they will be read and construed together so
far as determining the respective rights and
interests of the parties, although they do not
in terms refer to each other.
501 P.2d at 271
The facts of the instant case are much more compelling
than those in Bullfrog Marina, supra.
~laintiff

At trial both the

and the Defendant testified that the two writings

constituted "one transaction, one agreement, and two documents
put together represent[ing] the total agreement." (T@ 42,45,70).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In addition, the Defendant testified that his main
interest and concern was in the case of the restaurant
facilities and that the offer to purchase the theatre equipment was due to his perception of the lease of the restaurant
and the purchase of the equipment as a "package deal",

(T @105),

Indeed, the very documents themselves indicate that intention;
one clause of the purchase agreement provides that "sale contingent
upon buyer .•.. approving lease agreement attached to contract."
In the

Bullfrogt~ina

case, this Court characterized the

question of the inTegration of a single document as a factual one.
501 P.2d at 270.

In the present case, not only was there no

evidence that the two documents constituted separate
agreements, there was an abundance of uncontroverted testimony
that the two writings together constituted the terms of the
agreement between the parties.

The holding of the trial judge

that the two agreements were separate and not merged was

contra~

both to the law of this state, and to the uncontroverted evidence
produced at trial, and should be reversed.

POINT II.
THE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT OF RECOVERY AGAINST
DEFENDANT IS LIMITED TO RETENTION OF 'l HE DEFENDANT • S DOWNPAYMENT PURSUANT TO THE LIQUIDATED DA~IAGES CLAUSE OF THIS
AGREEMENT.
Damages:
(continued on page 9)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is the well-settled law of this State that when a
contract for sale contains a liquidated damages clause, exercisable at the option of the seller, any retention of past payments constitutes a binding election by the Seller to rely
on the liquidated damages clause as his sole remedy.
Land Funding Ltd.,

555 P.2d

957 (Utah 1976)

Dowding v.

and cases cited

therein.
In this regard, counsel for the Defendant made a timely
motion to strike the damages alleged in the complaint, (T at 101)
which motion was subsequently denied.

In ruling on the motion,

the trial judge distinguished the cases presented to him on the
basis that those cases dealt with contra~ts which were
disaffirmed at their relative inception, whereas the contract
at issue in this case had undergone partial performance.

This

distinction, however, runs counter to both the express terms of
the agreement and the underlying purposes of the law.
The portion of the contract relevant here, is found
in the document entitled "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase", and provides:
In the event the purchaser fails to pay
the balance of said purchase price or complete
said purchase as herein provided, the
amounts paid herein shall, at the option of
the Seller, be retained as liquidated and
agreed damages.
This clause was further explained in a subsequent provision

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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which states that "$1,000.00 is non-refundable if buyer
is unable to perform on contract •••. " (emphasis added).
These two provisions make it clear that the breach which
triggers the liquidated damages clause is not a repudiation
of the contract before any execution thereof but any failure
to complete the purchase "as herein provided!"

Therefore, the

rule established by the cases cited supra should also apply in
the present case.
In addition, to hold as the trial court did contravenes
the policy which forms the basis of the law.
Blumenthal,

11 Lt.ah 2d

51, 354 P.2d 856

In Close vs.

(1960) the Court

noted that the option of retaining liquidated damages was for
the sole benefit of the seller and that the seller will always
choose the option to his advantage and to the disadvantage of
the buyer.
"Under those circumstances the clause should
be strictly applied against the seller and he should be held to
meet its requirements with exactness."

354 P.2d at 857.

In line with this strict application, the Court states
that:

"where there was an option to be exercised rccgarding

the forfeiture of the deposit as liquidated damages, the fact
that the money

WJ.S

kept was incontrovertible evidence that the

Seller had exercised the option to keep it .... " [emphasis
added)

That a contract is breached after partial execution

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not change the underlying policies.

The seller still has

the option to elect to retain liquidated damages.

According

to the terms of the contract, these liquidated damages can
include not only the deposit but all payments received up to
the time of the breach.
a Seller still exists.

The possibility of overreacting by
That the parties began performance

on the contract should not be sufficient to justify the rejection
of the rule enunciated in Andreasen vs. Hansen,
335 P.2d

8 Utah 2d. 370,

404 (1959) and recently affirmed in Dowding v. Land

Funding Ltd., supra.,

that a binding election has been made

when a party to a breached contract retains monies and makes no
offer to return them.
In the present case, the Plaintiff himself testified that
he did not return any monies paid to him under the contract, nor
did he make any offer to return them. (T at 46).
This case, then, falls squarely under the rationale
of Andreasen, and Close, and the trial judge erred in denying the
motion to strike damages.
In the event this court holds that the two documents involved
here are two separate and distinct agreements, it should be noted
that the $1,000.00 down-payment and the liquidated damages
provision run to the agreement to purchase the equipment and not
to the lease

of the property.

For this reason, any damages

arising out of the breach of contract to purchase the equipment
must be limited to the $1,000.00 deposit made on that contract.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-11Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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In addition, if the documents are separate and distinct,
it would be error for the trial judge to apply the $1,000.00
retained on the purchase of the equipment, as compensation
for damage to the real property.

The deposit would have no

relationship to the lease agreement.
Attorneys Fees:
In Andreasen v. Hansen, supra., a case where liquidated
damages was held to be the only available remedy, this Court
stated that "the award of attorneys fees is conditioned upon
the necessity for incurring them and upon the Plaintiff's
being justified in their demands." 335 P.2nd at 407.

In that

case, the Court reversed the award of attorney's fees
based on the reasoning that as recovery of liquidated damages
did not justify the retention of an attorney or pursual of a
lawsuit, no compensation could be awarded for those expenses.
The same reasoning should apply in the instant case.

As the

Plaintiff's sole remedy was the retention of liquidated damages,
the attorney's fees incurred in this case are unjustified and
therefore, the award of attorney's fees should be reversed.
Again, in the event that this Court should find the two
documents constitute two separate agreements, the above
reasoning should nonetheless apply to that agreement
entitled "Earnest. Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase" and the
award of attorney's fees should be reduced by that amount
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I

incurred by the attorney in the enforcement of that agreement.

POINT III

IN THE EVENT THIS COURT HOLDS AGAINST POINTS I AND II
AS HEREIN STATED, THEN THE AWARD OF THE DOWNPAYMENT TO THE
PLAINTIFF CANNOT BE UPHELD: SAID AWARD BEING CONTRARY TO LAW
AND FACT.
A. THE TRIAL COURT SPECIFICALLY RULED THAT THE
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO CLEARLY SHOW WHAT DAMAGE WAS SUFFERED BY
DEFENDANT'S RENOVATION OF THE PIZZA PARLOR; THEREFORE, THE
AWARDING OF DEFENDANT'S $1,000.00 DOWN-PAYMENT "FOR ANY SUCH
DAMAGE" WAS CONTRARY TO LAW.
In all civil suits the burden is on the party seeking relief
to show by a preponderance of the evidence any damages dought.
In actions by a landlord against a lessee for recovery of waste
or damage to property, the damages and amount thereof must
be shown with reasonable certainty.
The burden is on the Plaintiff in an
action for waste to show that waste has
been committed to his injury, and to show
with reasonable certainty the particular
act or acts of waste, as well as the amount
of damage, if any, to the freehold.
78 Am.
Jur.
2d Waste§ 41 (1975), emphasis added.
To warrant a recovery based on the value of
property injured or destroyed, there must
be proof of its value or evidence of such
facts as will warrant a determination of its
value with reasonable certainty. 22 Am Jur.
2d. Damages § 201 (1965), emphasis added.
In this acrion, the Plaintiff did not show the amount or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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extent of damage with reasonable certainty and the lower
Court so held.
stated:

In the DECISION the lower court specifically

"Plaintiff's claim for rennovation or repair of

work started by the Defendant in the Pizza Parlor did not
clearly show what damage was suffered."
In the CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, it was stated:

"the Plaintiff's

claim for rennovation or repair of work started by the Defendant
in the pizza parlor did not clearly show the extent of damage
suffered."

If the Plaintiff "did not clearly show what

damage was suffered," then he obviously failed to show with
"reasonable certainty" the damage suffered, and should have
been precluded from recovery.
However, after finding that the Plaintiff had not shown
what damage was suffered, the court awarded Plaintiff the
$1,000.00 downpayment made by the Defendant "for any such
damage".

Again, the words "any such damage" implying that

the damages had not been shown with reasonable certainty.
This award of the downpayment was completely unjustified
and contrary to law.

After having held that the Plaintiff had

failed to clearly show what damage was suffered, an
award by the Court would necessarily be arbitrary and based
solely upon the whims of the trial judge.

It is this type

of award that the rule requiring "reasonable certainty" is
designed to prevent.

It has become well recognized that render-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'

ing judgment for substantial damages without proof of the damages
actually suffered is reversible error.
200

Okl. 192, 191 P. 2d 934 (1948).

See, Rollins vs. Rayhill,
Therefore, the award of

the $1,000.00 downpayment to the Plaintiff should be reversed
on this basis alone.

B. EVEN IF THERE IS SOME BASIS FOR AWARDING DAMAGES
AFTER HAVING RULED THEY WERE NOT CLEARLY SHOWN, THE AWARD OF
THE DOWNPAYMENT MUST STILL BE REVERSED BECAUSE ANY DAMAGES
FOUND WOULD BE BASED ON MERE SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE.
In Bunnell vs. Bills,

13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597,

602 (1962), this Court held that "damages' cannot be found from
mere speculative and conjectural evidence."

In this case,

the evidence concerning damages to the restaurant kitchen was
completely speculative.
The only testimony that was given during the trial to
establish the amount of damages to the kitchen was given by
the Plaintiff, Mr. Foote, and be admitted on cross examination
that be was guessing as to damages.

His testimony was as follows:

(T. at 27, and 58)

DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q:

do you have a judgment as to what the
approximate cost will be to repair the kitchen?

A:

Well, I am just hoping that that figure would
come in around $1,500.00.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
----

-~

Q:

When you are saying that you are hoping that
the repair figure in the kitchen would be around
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$1,500.00, I take it what you are telling us is
that it might be more than that and it might be
less, and that is a guess that you have given?

A.

Yes.

No testimony was given as to specifically what the hoped
for figure of $1,500.00 was to cover.

It is not clear from the

record whether the money would be used to finish the remodeling
that the Defendant had started, to rebuild the kitchen to the
condition it was before the lease, or to construct a kitchen
that would incorporate aspects of both (See T. at 26, 27)
If the kitchen was to be finished in accordance with what
the Defendant had started, or if it were to be completed
incorporating aspects of both, then the remodeling that the
Defendant had commenced could not reasonably be considered to
be damaging at all.

In addition, there was no testimony

to indicate that even if the kitchen was going to be rebuilt
to the condition it was before the lease, that the expenses the
$1,500.00 would cover would be only those that were necessary,
and not those that could be considered extravagant expenses.
Yet, the law is well established that:
Damages recoverable by a landlord as the cost
of restoration in an action for waste are generally
limited to the reasonable expenses of restoring
the property to its former condition, and they do
not necessarily cover all that the lessor chose to
spend or was obliged to spend under the circumstances.
Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1106, 1113 (1962).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Without evidence beyond a mere guess, and without
evidence to indicate how the guessed at amount of money was to be
used, the award of the downpayment to the Plaintiff was based
purely on speculation.

This is evidenced by the fact that the

trial court did not determine the amount of damage, did not award
the $1,500.00 prayed for, but simply awarded the downpayment.
There was absolutely no evidence presented at trial that
would justify the awarding of the $1,000.00 downpayment, as opposed to an award of $900.00, $800.00, $700.00, or any other
amount lower than the $1,500.00 prayed for.

If there was evidence

of damages at all (which there was not), it would be for the

•

$1,500.00 that was prayed for, and not for the arbitrary amount
of the downpayment.
The above mentioned facts and testimony, coupled with
the decision of the trial court, indicate that the lower court
arrived at the arbitrary amount of the downpayment merely because
it was convenient. Since the purpose of damages is to award just
compensation, they should not be determined solely on the basis of
judicial convenience.

This amounts to the worst kind of speculation;

i.e., awards not based on the evidence presented, but on the desire
of the trial court not to have to deal with the evidence presented.
Therefore, the award of the $1,000.00 downpayment to the Plaintiff
should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION

The Defendant-Appellant contends that his Points on
Appeal are well taken, and the requested relief should be
granted on the merits of the case.

Respectfully submitted,

J).jU
D. JOHN MUSSELMAN
Attorney for Appellants

Mailing Certification:
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief to Milton T.
Harmon, Attorney for Respondent, 36 South Main Street, Nephi,
Utah 84648, this

_.:]_Js/

day of May, 1980.
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